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Abstract 
Online communities are popular sites for collective sensemaking. This study explores 
sensemaking in one such community following the closure of Olint Corp, a highly‐
successful Jamaican investment club. After Olint’s disbanding, Jamaicans reconnected 
through online communities to make sense of their financial losses; to make sense of 
Olint – seen variously as an altruistic endeavour, a global currency trader, or Ponzi 
scheme – and to make sense of themselves as enterprising investors. This narrative 
inquiry unveils their rich, multi‐voiced, fragmented storying of Olint and its founder, 
once praised as a ‘financial messiah’. 
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Sensemaking in an online community after financial loss: 
Enterprising Jamaican investors and the fall of a financial messiah 
 
Introduction 
 
For the citizens of developing nations, says Cox (1997: 87) the key phrase in the 
market revolutionary vocabulary is ‘not yet’.  These citizens are admonished by 
international financial institutions to have patience for yet another ‘development 
decade’, whereupon ‘everyone’s cup will run over’ (Cox, 1997: 87). But for citizens of 
developing nations, ‘not yet’ has taken too long. Surrounded by ever-greater inequality 
within their own countries, many turn to speculative investment vehicles in pursuit of 
too-good-to-be-true investment return.  
Krige (2012) locates such proliferating schemes within the logic of 
financialisation of everyday life, embracing as it does everyday speculation and risk-
taking. According to Krige, such logic transforms finance ‘into a field of dreams as well 
as a field of schemes’ ( 2012: 73), opening up spaces for financial tricksters to flourish 
where there are rampant structural inequalities. Krige’s view is borne out by the scale of 
national fraud perpetuated by schemes in developing countries since the 1990s; from 
Albania to Colombia, Romania to Serbia, and Lesotho to South Africa (Carvajal et al, 
2009; Krige, 2012).  
During 2004-2008, the Caribbean island of Jamaica cultivated its own field of 
schemes when scores of unauthorised, self-styled ‘investment clubs’ acquired singular 
prominence and trust by tapping into two narratives governing contemporary Jamaican 
realities. Firstly, investment clubs promoted global capital markets’ allure and capacity 
to yield higher returns than traditional banking instruments. Secondly, many investment 
clubs aligned with popular charismatic churches supporting Jamaica’s poor. In a society 
heavily-stratified by social class and a never-ending wait for global economic status, 
investment clubs took Jamaica by storm.  High-risk investing was presented as the 
‘saviour’ of the poor (Dawes, 2004; Hall, 2010: Investforlife, 2008b). Jamaicans from 
all walks of life rejected authorities’ warnings, accepting the financial risk of investment 
clubs into their homes, and into many churches, where ‘prosperity gospel’ had become 
an extension of a grand narrative of market revolution (Cox, 1997).   
Of all the Jamaican investment schemes operating in the 2000s, none equaled 
the status of Olint Corp. Its founder, David Smith, an established currency trader, even 
came to be described as a ‘financial messiah’ (Reid, 2009).  However, the club’s 
unauthorised status led to protracted struggles with the financial regulator. In July 2008, 
Olint shut Jamaican operations without warning, effectively disbanding the club. 
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Bewildered investors reconnected via online communities, struggling to make sense of 
investment club mania and Olint’s closure, in the face of competing interpretations from 
the media, banks and the regulator. Jamaicans negotiated different versions of events, 
producing a series of polyphonic stories to make sense of Olint’s fall, and of themselves 
as enterprising investors. As Jamaicans struggled to come to terms with financial loss, 
these polyphonic stories served as memory aids, diagnostic tools, a means for social 
control, and expression of liberation (Brown et al, 2009).  
The article offers rare perspectives on mediations of finance in a developing 
country at the margins of global markets, using narrative analysis to highlight the 
dualities of global-regional financial discourses. Building on previous work (Berger and 
Messerschmidt, 2009; Campbell et al, 2008; Herrmann, 2007), the study offers deeper 
understandings of authorship and power relations in online communities, and their links 
with wider sociocultural and political conditions.  The article further provides a voice to 
those twice-marginalised – by citizenship in a small, developing state and by 
speculation in unauthorised schemes – thus building on previous work exploring 
everyday investors’ engagement with informal finance (Austin, 2004; Krige, 2012; and 
Meagher, 2009). However, the article’s unique contribution stems from its innovative 
insights into everyday investors’ use of online forums to make sense of economic events 
and their own relationship to them; renegotiating their investor subjectivities through 
online conflict and public deliberation. I begin first by discussing three key theoretical 
concepts: enterprising investors, online communities and sensemaking, before 
presenting the background to the data set – exploring contemporary Jamaican financial 
narratives, investment club mania and the rise and fall of Olint. Thereafter, I introduce 
my selected method of narrative inquiry, using online forums as data; discussing 
findings thematically, together with implications and contribution. 
 
Online financial communities – Sensemaking while speculating 
 
The theoretical discussion links three integral concepts – enterprising investors, 
online communities and sensemaking. Following Langley (2007: 74), I position 
investment as a technology-of-the-self under neoliberal governmentality. The small, 
developing state of Jamaica is itself a neoliberal economy where the ‘enterprising self’ 
increasingly involves acquiring financial asset portfolios, and where calculated financial 
risk ‘holds out the prospect of pleasure through returns’ (Langley 2007, 74).  In the 
Jamaican context, investment clubs are an extended technology-of-the-self, helping to 
constitute enterprising investors; as are new enterprising communicative practices such 
as online financial communities, where investors research and share investment 
information (Herrmann, 2007).    
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While orthodox neoliberal narratives present investing as an empowering 
activity, when substantial losses occur, investing can disempower its subjects. The 
conventional view of the enterprising investor as active, independent and bold must 
therefore be problematised (French and Kneale, 2009; Langley, 2007; Martin, 2002). 
The financial self is never undivided, overlapping with other biopolitical domains – 
Jamaican investor subjectivity cannot be clearly demarcated from other subject 
positions as workers, consumers, churchgoers or  citizens (French and Kneale, 2009; 
Langley, 2007; Martin, 2002).  
Online communities are large collectives of voluntary members debating 
common interests, experiences or convictions (Sproull and Arriaga, 2008: 898).  
Investment is itself a social activity where people often make decisions collectively. 
Consequently, online financial communities can be educational forums where novices 
access and share expert investment tips, tutorials and pre-purchase information (Berger 
and Messerschmidt, 2009; Campbell et al, 2009).  Through online forums people can 
develop far-flung communities that assemble and disperse quickly, while allowing 
everyday citizens to break public silence through debate on multiple sites, invoking the 
notion of the ‘town hall’ (Weger and Aakhus, 2003). Online communities can be 
consumer-based, vocation-based or place-based; linked with common conditions, 
shared concerns or collaborative work, though rarely mutually exclusive in remit 
(Sproull and Arriaga, 2008). For example, online communities debating Jamaican 
investment mania included political forums and business forums (e.g. 
onejamaica.blogspot.com and siliconcaribe.com). Of the dedicated online financial 
communities, some promoted wealth generation (e.g. invest4life.wordpress.com)1, 
others were investment club ‘fan’ communities (e.g. wealthmax.wordpress.com), still 
others were launched by concerned citizens keen to prevent Jamaicans from losing 
money through investment clubs (e.g. investforlife.wordpress.com).  
Online communities are also sites of power, where conflict is rife (Campbell et 
al, 2009). Members adopt specific roles, attacking or defending standpoints. In online 
financial communities, members may generate mutual investment strategies one 
moment, taking adversarial positions the next. Deceptive, manipulative behaviours are 
readily observable; while dishonest participants use multiple messages or identities for 
personal gain. Such cycles of conflict help sustain online financial communities, since 
power struggles can enhance the quality of information available (Campbell et al, 2009; 
Weick, 1995). Online financial communities can also be spaces of resilience and 
resistance, with social and political edge.  
One typical activity for online communities is sensemaking, a process of 
meaning-production wherein people reflect on and interpret phenomena, producing 
intersubjective accounts (Weick, 1995). Jamaica’s online financial communities served 
a number of sensemaking purposes during the country’s investment mania. Firstly, like 
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most online financial communities, Jamaican forums made sense of financial markets 
through stories by selecting and interpreting available information (Abolafia, 2010; 
Tarim, 2012), thus reducing the ambiguity of ‘mass amounts of equivocal financial 
messages’ from innumerable sources (Herrmann, 2007: 14). However, engaging with 
an opaque, informal organisation like Olint meant Jamaican investors lacked 
conventional financial sensemaking tools such as analyst reports, shareholder letters, 
stock market news and other published, accessible ‘conventionalised’ indicators 
(Tarim, 2012; Abolafia, 2010; Herrmann, 2007). To this end, Jamaican investors used 
sources of unconventional wisdom – rumour and black market knowledge – to make 
sense of Olint’s opacity.  
Secondly, in sensemaking terms, Olint’s demise represented what Weick (1993: 
633) calls a ‘cosmology episode’ when people suddenly, deeply feel the universe is ‘no 
longer a rational, orderly system’.  The cosmology episode for Jamaican investors was 
triggered when Jamaica’s regulator threatened investment clubs’ legitimacy; the episode 
intensified once Olint’s monthly payouts faltered. Jamaicans flocked to online 
communities to make sense of conflicting messages about schemes, and to make sense 
of their own enterprising efforts as ‘rational investors’ versus morally-questionable 
‘speculators’ (Preda, 2009: 3), arriving at different story outcomes based on market-
based and social experiences, relationships and positionalities (Tarim, 2012).  Members 
justified investment choices, deflecting blame for financial loss, while engaging in 
imagination and conspiracy (Tarim, 2012): Were investment schemes simply private 
members’ clubs? Sophisticated global trading outfits? Were they intent on national 
development? Or merely a façade for fraudsters? Worse still, were the clubs engaged in 
international money laundering, thus posing a threat to Jamaica’s entire financial 
system?  Ultimately, online financial communities generated explanations 
retrospectively (Weick, 1995) to justify investment mania, making sense of massive 
investment losses following the clubs’ demise.  
 
Jamaican financial narratives 
 
The Commonwealth Caribbean, a region of small, mainly island states, black 
populations and parliamentary democracies, represents an atypical Third World region 
(Stone, 1985).  As with other Anglophone states in this sprawling area, Jamaica has 
cultural, economic and political links with Europe and North America, enjoying middle-
income status as a ‘semi-peripheral’ state: rapidly-modernised, and deeply incorporated 
into the world capitalist system as a tourist mecca, agriculture and mineral exporter; 
supplying cheap migrant labour, while consuming western culture and commodity 
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exports (Stone, 1985). Within this context, Jamaican financial narratives pose a series of 
dualities chronicling success and failure intertwined.   
Firstly, Jamaica is a highly-open market, reasonably competitive in world trade, 
and connected with the global financial system. Deregulation during the 1980s opened 
up Jamaica’s financial sector to global activity. Financial services remains important to 
Jamaica’s economy, despite a highly-damaging domestic financial crisis in 1996 when 
21 of 37 banks failed. However, Jamaica’s financial sector remains essentially 
disarticulated from its surrounding region (Gayle, 2002).  Caribbean stock market 
activity, for example, remains restricted to cross-listings between Jamaica, Barbados 
and Trinidad & Tobago. Geography and language are contributing factors: Jamaica lies 
near Spanish-speaking Cuba and Francophone Haiti, hundreds of miles away from 
much of the Anglophone Caribbean, yet Latin-American integration remains low on 
Jamaica’s political agenda. 
Jamaica’s investment club mania was heavily-intertwined with financialisation. 
Many Jamaicans began investing in equities and fixed income products after 1980s 
deregulation, when banks and brokerages mushroomed. The authorities, together with 
the banking sector, controlled Jamaica’s investment domain, determining what 
investments were ‘legitimate and accessible’ (Preda, 2009: 17). Anything outside this 
domain was deemed speculation – gambling dressed up as investment. However, 
Jamaican asset values were constantly threatened by currency devaluation, a shrinking 
economy, indebtedness, weakening trade relations, poor infrastructure and high crime 
rates – outcomes that weakened the state’s legitimacy (CaPRI, 2007). State efforts to 
control money supply through high interest rates ‘hooked’ Jamaican investors on 
double-digit investment returns2, subsequently fuelling the collapse of the domestic 
financial sector in 1996. Bank savings rates fell steeply thereafter but lending rates did 
not, weakening the banking sector’s legitimacy (CaPRI, 2008). By the late 1990s3, 
entrepreneurial activities such as do-it-yourself currency trading began to fill the gap, 
while the first investment clubs emerged.  
The clubs were unauthorised, yet they cannot be neatly confined to Jamaica’s 
informal economy. Indeed, attempts to separate formal and informal sectors are 
problematic since state and bureaucratic mechanisms governing these distinctions are 
themselves ‘blurred and disputed terrain’ (Hull and James, 2012: 8). This highlights a 
further duality, namely the status accorded investment clubs within the Jamaican 
financial sector. As unauthorised vehicles, the clubs were informal schemes operating 
in the shadow of the formal banking sector (Carvajal et al, 2009). For example, it may 
be assumed that investment club members had bank accounts, mortgages and insurance 
policies, firmly integrating them as customers within the formal financial sector 
(CaPRI, 2008). Further symbiosis existed between the banking sector and unauthorised 
schemes, since banks benefited from accounts set up by investment club members and 
In press with New Media & Society, Nov 2015. Contact author before citing – c.bourne@gold.ac.uk 
7 
 
operators. Banks lent to more than a fifth of people who went on to invest in schemes, 
thus earning associated interest (CaPRI 2008).  Some brokerages reportedly invested in 
the clubs via ‘feeder funds’, while domestic and international financial institutions 
benefited from trading fees earned from investment club-related fund flows (KYC 
News, 2008).  
The final duality explored concerns investment clubs’ religious affiliations vis-à-
vis the state’s weakening legitimacy (CaPRI, 2007). The Church has long-played an 
important structural economic role in Jamaica, maintaining a powerful voice in political 
affairs, operating several media houses, and active in financial services through the 
credit union movement.The expansion of Jamaica’s informal economy was further 
accompanied by a proliferation of similar religious movements noted in other 
developing nations (Meagher, 2009). Jamaican investment club mania drew on this 
duality of religious and economic contexts. 
 
Jamaican investment club mania – Charismatic capitalism 
 
While little was known about Jamaican investment clubs at the height of the 
mania, some 50,000 investor accounts were opened between 2004-2008 representing  
US$1 to 2 billion (Carvajal et al, 2009). Most schemes were unregistered, unlicensed 
and unregulated affinity schemes, based on ‘exclusivity’, often promoted through 
churches. New members were admitted via referral, as enterprising investors leveraged 
their social networks for profit. Several clubs were founded by charismatic 
personalities, actively promoting a vision for national development; conjoining 
investing with ‘prosperity gospel’, promising God’s generosity here on earth (Hunt, 
2000). High-risk investments were ‘storied’ as the ‘saviour’ of poor Jamaicans (Dawes, 
2004; Hall, 2010; Investforlife 2008b). In many churches, clergy shared the investment 
club promise of ‘heaven on earth’ with their congregations, shifting church tithes from 
formal bank accounts into investment clubs (Hall, 2010). One government minister 
heralded the investment club era as one of ‘financial enlightenment’, releasing 
Jamaica’s masses from the ‘hegemonic control of the high priests’ of the formal 
banking system (Ennis, 2007), suggesting tensions between the regulator and the 
political directorate. 
Like formal investment houses, the clubs promoted the allure of global capital 
markets, promising much higher financial returns than standard investments could 
deliver. Investment club members signed contracts to ‘invest’ in various ‘high yield’ 
securities such as currency funds or commercial property. Many clubs had registered 
offices, staff and mechanisms allowing them (at least initially) to replicate a façade of 
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efficiency, professionalism and customer service offered by formal financial 
institutions. Clubs also sponsored high-profile events from football to beauty pageants 
(Carvajal et al, 2009). Club founders had discretion over where funds were allegedly 
invested, and wielded a highly-effective control strategy, delivering monthly returns 
between 6% and 20 %. At the height of the boom, some schemes delivered annual 
returns as high as 728% (CaPRI, 2008; Carvajal et al, 2009). While the formal banking 
sector denounced too-good-to-be-true returns (Meikle, 2006), this only fuelled 
investment mania, as did the regulator’s efforts first to regularise, then ‘quash’, 
unauthorised schemes. The clubs’ impossibly high returns, opaque business models, and 
eventual discarding of exclusive membership criteria triggered suspicion. In this 
environment, a number of online financial communities emerged to make sense of 
Jamaica’s investment club mania. 
 
The rise and fall of Olint  
 
Of all the investment clubs operating in Jamaica in the 2000s, Olint had the most 
meteoric rise and fall. The club was founded around 2003 by 34-year-old former 
currency trader, David Smith, an active member of a well-known charismatic church. 
During Olint’s start-up period, select membership was drawn from Smith’s social 
network, particularly church circles where Smith was soon regarded as a financial 
‘messiah’ sent by God to make Jamaicans rich (Espeut, 2011; Reid, 2009). The club 
incorporated in 2005 as Olint Corp; and its reputation for delivering 10% monthly 
return attracted many prospective members. Olint expanded into the Caribbean, and to 
South Florida with its large expatriate Jamaican community. The various Olint entities 
together attracted more than 6,000 clients. By the time Smith was indicted in 2010, 
Olint had amassed assets of at least US$220m (US District Court, 2011). 
From the start, Olint’s founder positioned the club as an indigenous institution 
on the side of ‘average Jamaicans’ (Investforlife, 2008b). Olint would end poverty and 
inequality where successive governments had failed.  Olint aligned with Church 
communities, launching the Olint Foundation with US$1 million to help the poor 
(Carvajal et al, 2009). The club sponsored international music festivals and major 
sporting events; wielding further influence through donations to Jamaica’s political 
parties (Carvajal et al, 2009). Olint also promoted financial sophistication and expertise 
through its Member Care Office in Kingston’s financial district, its password-protected 
website for client accounts (US District Court, 2011); and through Smith’s past 
experience as a currency trader at a well-known money market brokerage, where he 
claimed never to have sustained a monthly trading loss (US District Court, 2011).  For 
many, this expertise made Olint the ‘safest’ of all the investment clubs (CaPRI, 2008). 
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Yet Olint provided no operational transparency. Its member agreement stated only that 
Olint placed client funds in the currency exchange market for ‘investment in leveraged 
foreign exchange transactions’ (Olint TCI, 2008). No one knew how Smith achieved 
such high returns.  
Olint faced its first real challenge in 2006 when Jamaica’s financial regulator, 
the Financial Services Commission (FSC), executed search warrants on Olint’s office, 
seizing documents and issuing a ‘cease and desist’ order prohibiting Olint from dealing 
in unlicensed securities or investment advice (FSC, 2006).  In 2007, Olint’s bankers, the 
National Commercial Bank (NCB), closed Olint’s accounts after the club repeatedly 
failed to provide audited financial statements, in breach of regulatory requirements. 
Olint filed suits against both the FSC and NCB, but resulting litigation took its toll. By 
mid-2008, Olint had failed to make several monthly payments to members (Investforlife 
2008b). On 14 July 2008, Olint closed its Jamaican offices, announcing the decision to 
members by email. Citing ongoing problems with frozen international trading accounts, 
Smith portrayed Olint as the object of a grand conspiracy (Investforlife 2008), while 
failing to say when Olint would make good on outstanding member payouts.  
 
Disbanding and reconnecting: Investforlife 
 
Investforlife, an open-access community hosted on WordPress.com, quickly 
became a popular online forum for sensemaking activity following Olint’s retreat from 
Jamaica. Investforlife’s stated mission is to educate Jamaicans about risky, speculative 
investment vehicles, promoting ‘real’ investments while exposing investment clubs as 
scams (Investforlife, 2008a). The forum’s moderators launched the community after 
being barred from more ‘Olint-friendly’ communities (Investforlife, 2008b). 
Investforlife’s decision to publish Olint’s 14 July letter triggered the forum’s longest-
ever discussion thread. The growing online community struggled to make sense of 
events through deliberation, conflict and collective storying. In the following section, I 
examine these sensemaking positions in detail, first outlining my methodological 
approach before discussing my findings. 
 
Material and methods  
 
The study explores antenarratives constructed about Olint by Jamaican investors 
in an online community. My data is drawn from an archived discussion thread generated 
by members of ‘Investforlife’, a popular online financial community at the time of 
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Olint’s collapse. I am guided by Boje (2001) who describes antenarrative as a 
polyphonic or ‘multi-voiced’ way of telling stories ‘rich in fragmentation’ and ‘lacking 
in linearity’ (Boje, 2001: 9).  In order to deconstruct Investforlife community members’ 
storying of Olint and of themselves as enterprising investors, I draw on Jamaican 
dualities discussed earlier, including the growing influence of prosperity gospel and 
informal finance, the weakening legitimacy of state and banking mechanisms, and the 
contradictory yet symbiotic relationship between Jamaica’s informal and formal 
financial sectors. 
 
Analysing Social Media Data 
 
Online communities allow everyday citizens to discuss public issues at a 
distance, creating stories and shared meanings, systematising needs, values and 
concerns (Weger and Aakhus, 2003). Investforlife connected Jamaicans through a self-
regulating online community; an organised public (Weger & Aakhus, 2003) where 
Jamaicans shared investment tips, vented pent-up frustrations and contributed to 
narratives of investment clubs as either ‘genuine’ or ‘scams’. For Jamaican investors 
coming to terms with financial loss, stories told via Investforlife served as memory 
aids and diagnostic tools; a means of social control and liberation (Brown et al, 2009). 
The Investforlife community may also be understood as a site of collective Jamaican 
memory for Olint and other collapsed schemes. 
Investments are often shrouded in confidentiality; Olint compounded this by 
engaging in heavily-concealed activity without publishing audited accounts. Collecting 
data from online communities therefore provides a useful, if unusual, form of access to 
a partially-hidden financial scheme and the secrecy over its missing funds.  
Investforlife was just one of several free-to-view online communities debating 
Jamaica’s investment club mania; their discussions were often cited in media reportage 
(Investforlife, 2008b). Nonetheless, publishing online community discussions presents 
confidentiality issues. While there are parallels with publishing a letter in a newspaper 
or speaking in a public meeting, online communities combine those seeking visibility 
and those with private intent. However, the data supports public intent, since 
Investforlife is hosted on WordPress, a widely-used free, self-hosted non-synchronous 
blogging tool. I myself had no connection with Olint, and neither participated in nor 
monitored Investforlife at the time the discussion took place; encountering the 
discussion thread later on.  
Intense public reaction followed the publication of Olint’s letter on 14 July 
2008. Investforlife registered some 100,000 hits by midday (Investforlife, 2008b), with 
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comments peaking after 72 hours.  The resulting discussion is naturally occurring data 
enabling me to examine antenarratives produced ‘in situ’ (Whittle and Mueller, 2011) 
from active Investforlife posters.  My data set consists of 586 archived comments 
posted between 14 July and 21 August 2008.  Posts were contributed from 100 
separate pseudonymous user names4.  Most were abstract such as ‘fxtrader’, 
‘lostmymoney’, ‘reallydepressed’ and ‘sickolintclient’, but others might give clues to 
identity, so I preserved anonymity by not identifying speakers. I further screened the 
data, setting aside ‘flaming threads’ where the discussion descended into personal 
attack (Weger and Aakhus 2003; Herrmann, 2007). Where necessary, I paraphrased 
certain colloquial or ungrammatical comments typical of online threads (Weger and 
Aakhus, 2003). Where participants switched between English and Jamaican language, 
most Jamaican language is left intact for authenticity.  
 
Analytic procedure 
 
Narrative inquiry is a field with multiple strands (Brown et al, 2009). While I 
acknowledge varied approaches, I draw primarily on Boje’s (2001) perspective of 
antenarrative, described as ‘multi-voiced ways of telling stories’, ‘rich in fragmentation’ 
and ‘lacking in linearity’ (Boje, 2001: 9). Antenarrative aptly describes the collective 
storytelling via Investforlife where performing stories is a key part of members' 
sensemaking, characterised by polyphony – many overlapping, interweaving, 
sometimes competing storylines (Boje, 2001). The ‘ante’ in antenarrative has a double 
meaning: both being ‘before’ a coherent and complete narrative is finalised with an 
agreed plot; as well as being about ‘speculation’ – the ambiguity of trying to narrate the 
flow of events as they are experienced (Boje, 2001; Whittle and Mueller, 2011).  
Antenarrative therefore captures the lived experience of storytelling in online 
communities where stories are constructed in fragmented, piecemeal fashion by 
multiple authors, never finalised, and open to new ‘twists’ in the re-telling. By 
recovering the polyphonic qualities of Jamaican investors’ storytelling and the 
discursive struggles triggered by catastrophic financial loss, I seek to improve our 
understanding of the narrative of marginalised investors for whom meanings are indeed 
fragile (Brown et al, 2009). Stories constructed via the Investforlife community helped 
‘make sense of change, explain it, domesticate it’ (Brown et al 2009: 328), perhaps even 
diminishing the emotional power of Olint’s closure while helping investors to diagnose 
problems and make decisions. I have deconstructed the text in line with Jamaican 
financial dualities – examining how ‘fleeced’ investors renegotiated Olint’s utopian  
narrative.  I further highlight alternate stories; reinterpreting subtle hegemonies and 
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deconstructing occluded meanings (Boje, 2001; Brown et al, 2009) in the Investforlife 
discussion.  
 The issue of narrative ownership was central in analysing and presenting the 
material. As researcher, I have effectively re-narrated investors’ lives unasked, 
interweaving Jamaican investors’ stories into the larger phenomenon of 
financialisation. Yet the study is intended to be emancipatory, thus ethical (Brownlow 
and O’Dell, 2002), by faithfully reflecting the narrative’s momentum while shining a 
light on investor sensemaking online.  
Since Investforlife is itself a site for power, its participants – while anonymous – 
may reflect diverse groups exerting various positions of influence (Brownlow and 
O’Dell, 2002) ranging from wealth, education, social and professional position and 
financial expertise, giving them varying degrees of proximity to the ‘truths’ about Olint. 
I was further conscious that different narratives could be simultaneously produced 
through the same initiative, that participants might follow multiple sensemaking and 
sensegiving strategies. My close reading of the text (see Investforlife, 2008b) resulted in 
five broad deconstructions, fundamentally interdependent, but presented individually 
for clarity.   
 
Analysis: Olint investors – making sense of loss 
 
Narrating the ‘other’ investor: faith versus reason 
 
The first antenarrative theme draws on conflicting presentations of investing in 
general, and Jamaican investing in particular. As Preda (2009) argues, whoever controls 
the domain of investment activity determines what constitutes rational investing versus 
speculation or gambling. Where the state and banking sector once controlled Jamaica’s 
investment domain, the legitimacy of these institutions had weakened in the face of a 
growing informal economy (CaPRI, 2007). Investment clubs also had religious backing 
from the Jamaican Church, which retains its centuries-old legitimacy. Religious 
association was integral to Olint’s promotional activity, with earlier members recruited 
from charismatic churches preaching prosperity gospel.  Olint’s corporate identity drew 
on prosperity gospel narratives, promising riches here on earth rather than the 
‘hereafter’.  
Against this background, conflict emerged within the Investforlife forum as one 
set of investors narrated the ‘other’ disparagingly; pitting ‘rational’, pragmatic investors 
against faith-led ‘true believers’ and ‘speculators’. Those Investforlife participants who 
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were true believers declared Olint had been founded on a ‘prophetic word…not fly by 
night Ponzy scheme as the white collarist are saying’ (Investforlife, 2008b). One 
participant insisted he/she was ‘just a believer in [DS]’5, protesting that David Smith, 
Olint’s founder, had ‘done wonders for a lot of Jamaicans’; ‘the poor guy a try him 
BEST fi get weh money back’. Another implored participants to pray for Smith: 
 
‘This is truly a Test…all bloggers must pray for DS and his vision to break 
the back of Poverty for many people.  Therefore let’s declare that: no weapon 
forged against DS and Olint will prevail…’ 
 
Olint’s supporters maintained that by helping Jamaica’s poor, Smith had shown 
‘too big a heart’, issuing ‘biblical’ warnings to his detractors: ‘Too much “society” 
people… cant say how THEY earned THEIR money. AS i say, who God bless no man 
curse… unu be careful.’ 
Other true believers prayed for outstanding funds to be miraculously restored. 
By contrast, more sceptical Investforlife members queried Olint’s links with the Church, 
objecting that religion and money ‘don’t mix’. For some, Olint’s virtuous image was 
nothing more than good marketing. The sceptics reasoned that seven months without 
investment payouts was an unacceptable level of ‘blind faith’. Others heaped scorn on 
‘faithful Olinters’ for believing in Olint’s ‘messiah’ and refusing to see the truth. ‘Never 
trust anyone who asks you to pray for a solution’, scoffed one naysayer. Some accused 
Olint of hypocrisy, describing the 14 July letter as a callous communication, out of step 
with Olint’s virtuous image, causing investors undue stress. Smith’s character came 
under particular scrutiny: 
 
‘We all knew that he partied and drank a lot, yet we never asked ourselves, 
what type of trader always gambling, partying and coming home drunk? I see ppl 
saying that he is a Christian. Whateva. DS was a lowly money trader…Suddenly 
“fool fool” ppl start giving him billions.’ 
 
 
While this anternarrative pits ‘rational’ investors against ‘faith-based’ investors, 
a closer reading suggests that ‘rational’ and ‘faith-based’ views are neither separate nor 
othered, but intertwined, since faith and belief supply the cultural values needed to drive 
investment mania and wider market revolution (Hunt, 2000; Cox, 1997). 
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Narrating status through one’s ‘investor self’  
 
The second antenarrative theme illustrates Investforlife participants’ efforts to 
narrate themselves (Weick, 1995). Participants’ storying of Olint’s collapse is 
contingent on how they constitute their own identity as investors, and how they define 
their status within Olint and wider Jamaican society. Investforlife members reduced 
discomfort and repaired their own investor subjectivity by associating or disassociating 
with Olint’s collapse (Weick, 1995; Boje, 2001). What began as a narrative about 
Olint’s status as a biblical ‘David’ to the banking sector’s ‘Goliath’ developed into a 
narrative about investors’ own status within Olint, accentuated by self-narratives of 
social status and professional expertise.  This is most apparent in comments concerning 
a ‘run’ on Olint in December 2007, when many investors withdrew funds. Investforlife 
members speculated that spiralling redemptions had triggered international anti-money 
laundering (AML) investigations, effectively ‘freezing’ Olint’s funds. Some 
Investforlife participants positioned themselves as financial ‘experts’6 able to explain 
events: 
 
‘Although a run should not cause liquidity problems it can cause red flags 
to be raised in the system. …the broker …probably started to ask more questions 
[about Olint] in order to release the funds in keeping with AML procedures. 
Technically the “run” alerted the financial institutions to DS…’ 
 
Another Investforlife member offered ‘expert’ advice: 
 
‘Guys, Get a lawyer. Currency trading funds trade in the most liquid asset 
class in the word – cash. [There is] no reason a fund invested in cash should ever 
have problems meeting redemptions…You’ve been had.’ 
 
Other Investforlife members assert their status by claiming inside knowledge, 
itemising ‘facts’ supposedly gleaned from those ‘in the know’. One Investforlife 
member claimed he/she ‘was told personally’ that investor funds were safe because 
Olint only traded ‘with 1% of the money’. Another reported conversations with 
‘extremely large investors’ confirming Olint funds were intact on ‘the trading platform’ 
(Investforlife, 2008b). Still others proffered pessimistic ‘insider’ sources, alleging that 
Olint was bankrupt; that having lost ‘20 percent’ of its funds, Olint’s frenetic trading 
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had severely depleted the balance. Investforlife participants who provided ‘facts’ or 
useful hearsay to the online community thus acquired status in the discussion.  
Equally intriguing was the investor status narrated by the original Olint 
members, the ‘inner sanctum’, who maintained that all was well before Olint abandoned 
its exclusive membership criteria; that investment mania’s latter-day speculators were 
the root of Olint’s downfall. A schism developed between ‘Pro-linters’ and ‘Anti-
linters’ – those supporting Olint’s founder ‘as saviour’ and those denouncing David 
Smith as ‘common thief’ (Investforlife, 2008b).] In this antenarrative fragment, Olint’s 
founder is portrayed as a martyr, betrayed by those ‘he thought were loyal’. ‘Pro-linters’ 
in the discussion thread were adamant that Smith’s fear of further betrayal (through 
disclosure of proprietary information) was the main factor behind Olint’s sudden, 
distressing communiqué on 14 July 2008. No one ‘had anything negative to say about 
DS before last month’, maintained one Pro-linter. Another implored the online 
community to accept that: 
 
 ‘David does not want to disclose certain things at this time because…he 
has a case pending and…a lot of traitors in his club…Why U people put U money 
in something that was not regulated, that is a risk…so stop crying’.  
 
Hierarchical expressions of professional expertise, ‘insider’ knowledge and 
status supports Weick’s (1995) view that in sensemaking, the self, rather than the 
environment, is the primary text in need of interpretation. Investforlife subjects were 
‘produced’ by neoliberal pressures to be entrepreneurial, to engage with investment 
markets, calculating the risks of building asset portfolios against the ‘prospect of 
pleasure through returns’ (Langley, 2007:74). Such orthodox narratives present 
investing as an empowering activity. Within this orthodoxy, Investforlife members were 
keen to represent aspirational ‘investor selves’. In reality, many Olint members lost 
everything after mortgaging homes or emptying retirement funds (NIA, 2013), thus 
crushing the dream of the ‘investor self’.  
 
Storying oppression of enterprising Jamaican investors 
 
A third antenarrative storying Olint’s rise and fall was constructed by 
‘conspiracy theorists’ within the Investforlife community, keen to identify a hidden 
power behind Olint’s closure. Weick (1995: 57) contends that sensemaking does not 
rely on accuracy for coherence or plausibility, but on creation, invention, ideology and 
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emotional appeal. Hence there is plenty of room in sensemaking for conspiracy. In 
Jamaica, conspiracy theories about the rich abound, because of the secrecy with which 
Jamaica’s elites conduct their affairs (Stone, 1994). In this third antenarrative, Olint was 
positioned as a haven for Jamaicans struggling to access traditional finance. According 
to conspiracy theorists; Olint’s rapid success in a tiny marketplace posed a threat to 
Jamaican banks and brokerages, which sought revenge after losing customers. Two 
financial institutions came in for sharpest criticism – Jamaica Money Market Brokers 
(JMMB), David Smith’s former employer; and National Commercial Bank (NCB), 
Olint’s former bankers – illustrated by this poster’s comment: 
  
‘You really think the bank CEOs of Jamaica is gonna let DS run away with 
all their members? You don’t think they trying to put a stop to it? People who work 
in NCB or JMMB can TELL YOU how many members was leaving to go join 
OLINT.’ 
 
Dissenters argued that Olint’s trading accounts were offshore, thus frozen by US 
institutions not Jamaican ones. They also pointed out that the banking sector had 
rejected accusations of interference in Olint’s affairs. But conspiracy theorists argued, 
‘did anyone expect NCB or JMMB to say anything else?’ ‘They would never admit to 
having a hand in dismantling Olint’. Other Investforlife members suggested that a 
political conspiracy was at work. One blamed Olint’s downfall on the JLP government, 
speculating that the previous PNP administration might have prevented events from 
unfolding as they did. For another Investforlife member, the real conspiracy was a 
larger, more international one, with hidden power orchestrating events in Jamaica via 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF):  
 
‘…the report from the IMF indicating that all “unregulated” schemes be 
closed – you need to pay attention to that. Who funds the IMF? The World Bank. 
This thing is bigger than Jamaica…When was the last time you had an investment 
in a 3rd world country giving this type of returns and member banks of the World 
Bank are not making anything out of it?’ 
 
Still other Investforlife members lamented that no matter who was to blame, the 
national fallout amounted to ‘one billion [lost from] the economy’. According to this 
antenarrative, Jamaican investors had not been greedy to want 10% monthly return on 
their money. With Olint now closed, they argued, there would be no middle class left, 
since too many had mortgaged homes and withdrawn life savings for Olint investments. 
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Olint’s demise highlights bitter resentments fueled by increasing wealth concentration 
within Jamaican elites, through their privileged access to global markets. Investforlife 
participants drew on imagined market positions to influence how Olint’s fall would be 
storied, which versions accepted and rejected (Tarim 2012).  
 
Deflecting blame: Turning the mirror on Olint  
 
Further deconstruction of Investforlife antenarratives suggest the rise and fall of 
Olint can be ‘re-storied’ (Boje, 2001) to blame Olint for its own downfall. While Olint’s 
collapse certainly panicked investors, Weick (1995) contends there are ways for stories 
to slow escalating pressure, simplifying the tasks ahead. To this end, Investforlife 
participants turned the mirror on David Smith’s subjectivity as ‘expert’, discarding the 
narrative of ‘fallen messiah’ for a more prosaic tale of managerial incompetence. In this 
antenarrative, Investforlife members argued that while Smith may have been ‘one of the 
best forex traders in the world’, he was a ‘terrible businessman’; ‘not a crook or a thief’, 
but ‘way over his head’ (Investforlife, 2008b).  Members criticised Smith for opening 
up the club to wider membership too quickly, accepting ‘more members than its 
customer service and back office support could handle’. This move proved fatal, 
members argued, since no organisation is equipped to field calls from thousands of 
investors ‘calling or showing up for their money’.  
Other Investforlife participants were harsher still, describing Olint as little more 
than a ‘patty shop’7 with disastrous record-keeping and procedures. ‘Even hedge funds’ 
must produce annual reports ‘to show their investors the bottom line’, argued one 
member. According to this antenarrative, had Olint chosen transparency and legitimacy, 
its members would not have been left penniless. ‘Instead this attitude of rejecting all 
authority and the outlaw behaviour is why no one wants to touch Olint’. Another 
member concluded that:   
 
‘[Smith] acts like he has something to hide, now people are believing he 
does! International auditors [don’t] want to touch him, local banks don’t want to 
touch him, St. Lucia, Panama doesn’t want Olint in their country…If Olint had 
chosen to operate within the law…then [the banks] could not…touch David 
Smith…’ 
 
This excerpt transposes self-seeking stories with nationalist narratives. 
Olint, through its access to global currency markets, was supposed to supply 
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Jamaicans with new forms of subjectivity; new avenues for endurance, expression 
and racial progress. Instead, Olint’s fall destroyed billions in GDP, denting the 
reputation of Jamaica’s judiciary for failing to discipline Olint (NIA, 2013). 
 
Collaboration and Resistance: Investors as enterprising citizens 
 
Orthodox neoliberal narratives present investing as empowerment – fair play 
and progress through hard work. Yet, when substantial losses are incurred, investing can 
disempower its subjects. In this fifth and final theme, Investforlife members found new 
avenues for survival by re-storying themselves as enterprising citizens, shifting Olint 
antenarratives in new directions. One member recommended an independent audit of 
Olint’s accounts, others advised appointing law firms experienced in ‘going after money 
across different jurisdictions’. Members discussed useful internet sources on cross-
border insolvency, agreeing ‘to seek legal counsel’ collectively to reduce fees. Members 
also proposed organising meetings in Jamaica and neighbouring South Florida to 
establish ‘what rights we have’. ‘Like-minded people’ were encouraged to establish 
email contact; and to ‘download and save…statements from web-based sources’, storing 
receipts, wire transfers and contracts. One voice implored US-based investors to lead 
the way: 
 
‘If you are a US person, get your documentation ready, we might need to 
get US law enforcement involved….Americans are very aggressive when it comes 
to claiming jurisdiction when their citizens and banking systems are involved. We 
will get no help from the inept Jamaican state…’ 
 
The final antenarrative fragment also renegotiates investor subjectivities for the 
future, as Investforlife participants re-story themselves as optimistic and self-reliant; 
determined to learn Olint’s lessons while continuing to speculate in the currency 
markets. ‘Anyone’, can open an overseas account, one speaker proclaimed, ‘it just 
means that you pay taxes where the account is being held’, rather than to the Jamaican 
government and its ‘archaic banking system’. Another participant roused the group: 
 
‘If everyone gets their money back they should learn to trade for 
themselves, or get into a registered forex hedge fund – they do exist, most of the 
big investment houses and private ones have them.’ 
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There is no proof that Investforlife participants influenced future events, yet 
many investors subsequently filed suits against Olint in the Florida court system8.  
Meanwhile, enterprising Jamaican investors continued their quest for the ‘field of 
dreams’ in a ‘field of schemes’ (Krige, 2012), despite setbacks with Olint.   
 
Concluding discussion 
 
This study has engaged in a detailed interrogation of archived material from an 
online financial community; yielding rich, empirical data of multi-storied sensemaking 
following the collapse of an unauthorised investment scheme. The Investforlife data 
underscores the importance of online financial communities as sites for research, 
providing insight into how investors make sense of financial messages and reduce 
equivocality, while enabling the exploration of ‘porous connections’ (Herrmann, 2007: 
14)  between  investor discourses and societal discourses. The data also highlights 
simultaneous pressures for collaboration and conflict as an integral element of social 
inter-relations in online communities as they make sense of market events (Campbell, 
2009).   
The antenarratives explored here reveal many ways to ‘story’ Olint and 
Jamaica’s investment club mania; emphasising Jamaica’s financial markets as ‘blurred 
and disputed terrain’ (Hull and James, 2012: 8), where conflicting stories are enabled by 
struggles to retain investment capital within Jamaica when more enticing investment 
returns beckon beyond its shores. Conflicting stories are further enabled by struggles 
between formal financial institutions and unregulated schemes in the battle for 
customers in a shrinking economy.  
The study also shows that no matter what stance investors adopt in their 
sensemaking, there can be ‘no moment of respite from the exertions of financial 
activity’ (Martin, 2002: 37).  Many investors placed blind faith in Olint as a viable 
investment scheme and virtuous endeavour, well after the club’s reputation was cast in 
doubt. One might argue that blind faith allowed such investors to cope with financial 
losses, the toppling of their financial messiah, and a future filled with uncertainty. Yet 
other investors were unmoved by Olint’s religious narratives. In line with other studies 
(Krige, 2012; Austin, 2004), the Investforlife data suggests that many Jamaicans chose 
to believe in Olint because they were deeply suspicious of their own government and 
institutions. They were even less inclined to trust the motives of international financial 
institutions such as the IMF, which had denounced Caribbean investment mania.  Yet 
for every ‘Pro-linter’ there was an ‘Anti-linter’ imploring Investforlife members to see 
reason, to recognise Olint for the Ponzi scheme it was eventually proved to be.  
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Can online financial communities yield long-term consequences for consumer 
empowerment, or indeed for democracy? Certainly, in the Jamaican environment where 
there is a culture of secrecy among elites, and weak market surveillance by financial 
intermediaries or specialist financial media, online financial communities provided an 
important channel for unheard voices to ‘erupt’, through simultaneous collaboration 
and conflict, highlighting polyphonic stories as exercises in power. Yet online 
communities offer paradoxical purpose and efficacy (Campbell et al, 2008). The 
Investforlife forum may have been a useful tool, but it is unclear whether its hosts 
succeeded in either empowering investors or diverting anyone from Ponzi schemes. 
By recovering the polyphonic qualities of Jamaican investors’ storytelling 
through antenarratives triggered by Olint’s downfall, I have improved understandings 
of how investors make sense of the ‘shadowy’ corners of finance. More specifically, I 
have given voice to marginalised investors in the global periphery. I have further 
problematised the conventional view of the ‘enterprising investor’ as active, 
independent, bold and self-managed, by exploring investor subjectivities at their 
intersection with citizenship in a small state, where development status remains ‘not 
yet’. 
At the same time, this particular form of narrative inquiry has, through its 
analysis of antenarratives, provided unique understandings of how finance is mediated 
in a digital age. The visions and counter-visions of finance conjured up by Jamaican 
investors online reveal the fragmentary nature of sensemaking, and the competing 
moralities of rational investing versus blind faith and speculation used to make sense of 
financial catastrophes in the Jamaican context. Above all, the study offers new insights 
into how people collectively come to understand economic events, and understand  
themselves as ‘investors’ through conflict and deliberation online.  
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Footnotes 
1. Not to be confused with rival site, Investforlife.wordpress.com.  
2.   Bank of Jamaica (2015) statistics show savings rates reached 15.6% in 1996 (up to 
44% on overnight instruments). By 2001, savings rates fell to 8%, falling further 
throughout investment mania.  
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3. Approximate date; the first documented scheme collapse was in 2001 (CaPRI, 2008).  
4. A site administrators’ warning suggests some users adopted more than one identity 
(Investforlife, 2008b) 
5. Investforlife participants frequently referred to David Smith as ‘DS’. 
6. Expert claims are plausible: court documents reveal names of bankers, brokers, fund 
managers and corporate lawyers among Olint plaintiffs (US District Court, 2011).  
7. A derisive term for poor management; referring to Jamaican patties, a cheap, tasty 
fast food requiring little skill to sell profitably.  
8. David Smith was imprisoned by Turks and Caicos authorities in 2010, then extradited 
to the USA in 2011 to serve a concurrent 30 year sentence. 
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